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File w/ R. Casper

31 August 1965

BRIEF FOR THE DCI

1. The attached memorandum from DD/I on NPIC makes five proposals which can be summarized as follows:

a. With the assistance of DD/S&T, place increased emphasis on an R&D program, which would include initiating one systems study looking two years ahead and a second looking seven years ahead.

b. John Bross would survey the CIA-DOD photographic facilities to determine whether a coordinated use of all of the facilities would eliminate duplication of effort and minimize NPIC expansion.

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e. Change COMOR to a Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation (COMIREX) whose mission it would be to keep to a manageable level the requests for exploitation of photography and other imagery at the national center and to ensure that the reconnaissance collection requirements, the exploitation capability and the reconnaissance program are kept in balance in a way responsive to USIB needs.

2. I believe the above steps are appropriate for your approval in principle at this time.

L. K. White

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24 August 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : NPIC

REFERENCE : Memo for DDCI frm ExDir/Compt, dtd
9 Aug 65, Subj: NPIC - Status of
Actions Taken in Response to IG
Survey of NPIC, 18 June 1965

65-4588

1. This memorandum contains a recommendation for your approval in paragraph 14 below.


2. In the last few days I have personally reviewed the entire voluminous file of surveys and comments on the NPIC expansion problem and discussed the various plausible solutions with knowledgeable experts. Since the reference memorandum in paragraph 6 (with DDCI and DCI endorsement) pretty much puts the ball back in my hands, I am submitting herewith an integrated plan for keeping on top of the many ramifications of the NPIC problem while discharging our responsibility to the Intelligence Community for operating a truly "national" center for photographic intelligence. This memorandum emphasizes interagency aspects of the problem since other matters can be staffed out and reported on within the Agency context at any time and in as much detail as is desired.

3. All of the investigators and reviewers have agreed that the NPIC facility is a tremendous asset to the Intelligence Community and that the burden of work falling upon it is likely to increase greatly in the next few years. The tasks for which we must plan now are those which will enable the center to operate with maximum efficiency under close Intelligence Community scrutiny and expand its efforts in a tightly controlled way so as to meet clearly foreseeable workload increases and retain an option for flexible responses to future workload increases of a kind which may require drastic new departures.

(EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE NPIC)

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4. I think it is commonly agreed that there should be no turning away from the concept of maintaining a national center for the exploitation of photography as a service of common concern under "the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation with the interested members of the USIB" (NSCID 8). I think there should be no disagreement concerning assigning NPIC the additional task of handling and exploiting materials collected by

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a national service of common concern in the same way as conventional photography. NSCID 8 should be revised to make this clear. Perhaps we should change the name to National Imagery Analysis Center (NIAC), although this is not essential.

5. It is absolutely clear that the minimum "national" task for a central facility like NPIC is the "immediate readout" of materials collected by of all kinds in the same way photography is now handled at NPIC. This involves two "phases": (a) immediate examination of incoming data to discover changes in the status of highest priority targets as well as to provide prompt guidance for further collection by the reconnaissance program; and (b) systematic search of the entire data available in newly received materials to note new target objects of intelligence interest as well as to note changes in the status of targets of interest of less than highest priority. I conclude that in the interests of systematic handling and speed these tasks must always be performed centrally and that the burden of doing so for the next two or three years ahead is manageable without an enormous expansion of facility or staff.

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6. The difficult problem for a national center is to determine how many "detailed studies" or "research exploitation projects" are to be undertaken on intelligence topics of "national" concern over and above "immediate readout." I believe that a tighter screen on the ratification of such exploitation projects to NPIC can be established and will hold the workload for the next year or two down to manageable proportions. I describe the management technique for accomplishing this in the immediately following paragraph and the level of staffing which I consider appropriate as "manageable without an enormous expansion of facility or staff" in a subsequent paragraph.

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7. The key to maintaining a tight managerial control over the NPIC workload in "detailed studies" of "national" interest is the establishment of an effective USIB subcommittee machinery which will handle not only requirements for collection by [redacted]

[redacted] under the National Reconnaissance Program but also the scope and priority of the "national" effort in exploitation of the data so collected. I take it as a matter of principle as well as an observation from practical experience that one good committee of well-coordinated working groups is likely to be better than two committees. I have a strong staff to monitor the work of such a committee on my behalf and on the behalf of the DCI in the Reconnaissance Group of my Collection Guidance Staff.

I have arranged to provide a full-time Chairman of such a committee as a special assistant in the office of the DD/I and have selected a well-qualified intelligence officer with broad experience in the NPIC arena, namely,

[redacted], now on detached duty with U.S. MACV J-2 in Saigon. I am preparing a proposed modification of the existing COMOR machinery to expand its efficiency and streamline its operations. I suggest we change its name for psychological reasons, if no other, to make its name more descriptive of its task. I think "photo interpretation" calls up a picture of World War II conventional PI activities which inadequately conveys the highly technical requirements and complex

[redacted] involved now or soon to be involved in our reconnaissance program. I suggest a title something like Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation, probably to be known as COMIREX. It would be the Exploitation Working Group of this Committee which would keep the requests for exploitation of photography and other imagery at the national center down to a manageable level.

8. Needless to say, the establishment of a COMIREX for the purpose indicated in the immediately preceding paragraph would also provide a vehicle for ensuring that the reconnaissance collection requirements, the exploitation capability and the reconnaissance program are kept in balance in a way responsive to USIB needs. This would be a much-needed improvement in the present system, and it has been recommended by practically everybody.

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9. I think it is essential for the DCI and the Agency to maintain a substantial capability for "detailed studies" of imagery available at the national center to meet priority intelligence needs of primary interest to CIA rather than to the Intelligence Community as a whole. These needs would relate to intelligence matters of "departmental" (CIA) concern rather than "national" concern. I think the present mix of CIA detachment strength versus the national capability at NPIC is about right and the proportions should be kept approximately the same as the center expands. This would mean that, if the squeeze on reference of research projects to the national center becomes too tight in view of the workload there, the DCI would still have a capability for handling urgent projects without being subject to veto by other members of the Intelligence Community.

10. Within the context of this approach to the NPIC problem, I believe that we can handle all reasonable requirements put upon the center through FY 1967 as far as these can be sensibly forecast if we increase the staff at NPIC (or NIAC, if we rename it) to approximately [] (including the DIA contingent of [] an objective well justified in the FY 1967 budget, and if we invested about [] immediately in securing control of and renovating the approximately [] of space in the NPIC building now occupied by an agency having nothing to do with the center's work. It seems to me this expansion program is modest in terms of money and personnel in view of the upcoming workload and is within our capabilities to carry out promptly and effectively. If we begin an energetic recruiting program along lines you have suggested and already being planned by our Office of Personnel, we should be able to staff at that level by the end of FY 1967. This modest expansion program provides a "first plateau" along the road toward a later choice (about a year from now) between trying to stabilize at the level of effort projected above, come what may, or beginning to work toward a much more massive effort involving either new facilities or the incorporation of some of the many existing military photographic interpretation facilities in the national program. This latter choice,

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to my mind, would be preferable to proceeding to construct new facilities which now seem likely to be needed five years from now, disregarding the existence of a number of military facilities which seem to duplicate ours. I recommend we adopt this modest expansion program as Agency managerial and budget policy immediately if the principles set forth in this memorandum as a whole are accepted as goals to strive for.

11. By the end of the next fiscal year we should have had enough experience with the strengthened COMOR (COMIREX) to enable us to make a decision on the choice between the two paths beyond the "first plateau" as outlined in the preceding paragraph. In addition to some working experience with COMIREX, the major input we would need to make a wise decision would be the data that should be provided in a survey of existing PI facilities and their present and potential role in a coordinated photo exploitation effort. Mr. Bross is assuming responsibility on behalf of the DCI for the conduct of such a survey, and the Bureau of the Budget has informed him of their intention to send a letter to SecDef and the DCI requesting a joint Defense-CIA survey along these lines. We have earmarked two senior staff officers to assist Mr. Bross and we have passed him as useful background for his task a copy of a report on THE PHOTINT INFORMATION PROCESSING WORLD prepared under USIB subcommittee auspices.

12. I heartily concur in the key recommendations (including one from the [] for increased emphasis on an R&D program for NPIC (NIAC). We will initiate one systems study to deal with the present system and improvements looking two years ahead. We will initiate another one looking ahead for a five-year period beyond the two years immediately ahead. Thus the present R&D effort of [] per year (and increases thereafter) covering work in fifteen distinct areas (see Tab 5, NPIC White Paper) will, as a result of these studies, not only be subjected to scrutiny as to validity, but also sorted into projects to be linked with either the short-range

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25X1 program or the long-range program. Discussions are being held with [] and Mr. Becker preliminary to selecting the most suitable systems analysis organization to conduct these studies. Company proposals should be coming in by late September. To assist us in reviewing and expanding our R&D program, DD/S&T has designated [] of his staff. We shall undoubtedly expand research in the fields of man-machine relationships, human fatigue, machines that can be taught, precision-matching techniques and techniques for handling mass data. 25X1

25X1 13. Finally, I can report that NPIC management is moving ahead in the implementation of the many IG recommendations in which we have already concurred. I have directed the Director of NPIC to free a small group of his key staff officers of their daily responsibilities to ensure that these important problems are given priority attention. D/NPIC has done this and placed [] in charge of the group. I intend with the help of my senior staff officers in the O/DDI to work closely with this group and maintain a dynamic forward movement in the whole range of problems relating to NPIC.

25X1 14. I therefore recommend that you approve in principle the approach outlined above, and specifically the [] proposed level of CIA personnel for FY 1967. 25X1

[]
RAY S. CLINE
Deputy Director for Intelligence

Recommendation in para. 14 is APPROVED:

(Signed) W. F. Raborn

1 SEP 1965

Director of Central Intelligence

Date

RSC: jr

Distribution:

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